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ABSTRACT
The political climate is ripe for the United Nations system to successfully and effectively 
provide global collective security. Now that relations have improved between the ‘East’ and 
‘West’ the United Nations will indeed be able to broaden its role, and perhaps operate to its 
full capacity - to call into being the ‘New World Order,’ characterised by a Security Council 
able to respond swiftly and effectively to aggression and massive human rights violations 
through ‘police action’. However the significant and documented international humanitarian 
law violations by UN forces in the 1990s has raised the stakes. Thrice in the last decade of the 
20th Century, national adjudicative mechanisms failed to uphold justice for the victims of 
international humanitarian law violations by UN forces. The stakes are high; the credibility 
of UN sanctioned military operations, the accountability of UN troops to international 
humanitarian law standards and the adherence to the international rule-of-law regime 
envisioned in the drive to the permanent International Criminal Court. The UN's distinction 
in its status as a superior legal and moral entity means that it should be held to an even 
higher standard than the traditional subjects of the laws of war. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are concepts that have their origins in the United 
Nations Charter.1 Among other things, the UN Charter is based on principles of sovereignty, 
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1
 The Charter of the United Nations was established as a consequence of the United Nations Conference on the 
International Organisation held at San Francisco and was brought into force on 24 October 1945. As of 1995, 
membership in the UN had reached a total of 185 states. For a reproduction of the Charter, see I. Brownlie, Basic
Documents in International Law (4th, 1995) 1-35.
2non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.2 Although 
peacekeeping was not explicitly provided for in the Charter, it has evolved over the past half 
century into a well-developed concept governed by a distinct set of principles. During the 
Cold War the United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises 
because of vetoes - 279 of them - cast in the Security Council.3  However, since the end of the 
Cold War there have been fewer vetoes, and the security arm of the United Nations, once 
disabled by circumstances beyond its control, has emerged as a central instrument for the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Between 1947 and 
1985, a span of 38 years, the United Nations undertook thirteen ‘peacekeeping’ missions of 
varying scope, duration, and degree of success.4 Between 1985 and 1992, a span of only seven 
years, the United Nations undertook an equal number of missions with increasingly ambitious 
mandates.5 The UN has chosen the avenue of active military involvement in situations 
characterised by an escalating level of hostility that endangers the lives of its troops.
2
 Ibid., Articles 2(1), 2(7) and 33 respectively.
3 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-
General, GA 47th Sess, Agenda Item 10, para 14, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992), reprinted in ILM 953, 
958(1992) (Agenda for Peace).
4
 The thirteen missions between 1947 and 1985 include in chronological order: UN Special Committee on the 
Balkans (‘UNSCOB’) 1947-1951;UN Truce Supervision Organisation (‘UNTSO’) 1948-;UN Military Observer 
group in India and Pakistan (‘UNMOGIP’) 1949-;UN Emergency Force (‘UNEF I’) 1956-67;UN Observation 
Group in Lebanon (‘UNOGIL’) 1958;UN Operation in Congo (‘ONUC’) 1960-64; UN Temporary Executive 
Authority (‘UNTEA’) 1962-63; UN Yemen Observation Mission (‘UNYOM’) 1962-63; UN Force in Cyprus 
(‘UNFICYP’) 1964-; UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (‘UNIPOM’) 1964-66; UN Emergency Force II 
(‘UNEF II) 1974-79; UN Disengagement Observer Force (‘UNDOF’) 1974-; UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(‘UNIFIL’) 1978-. See W.M. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (1993) 8.
5
 In chronological order this missions include; UN Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan (‘UNGOMAP’) 
1988-89; UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (‘UNIMOG’) 1988-91; UN Angola Verification Mission 
(‘UNAVEM I’); 1988-91; UN Transition Assistance Group (‘UNTAG’) 1989-90; UN Observer Group in 
Central America (‘ONUCA’) 1989-91; UN Angola Verification Mission II (‘UNSVEM’) 1991-; UN Iraq-
Kuwait Observation Mission (‘UNIKOM’) 1991-; UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(‘MINURSO’) 1991-; UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (‘UNAMIC’) 1991-92; UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (‘UNTAC’) 1992-;l UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (‘UNPROFOR’) 1992-; UN Operation in 
Somalia 1992-.Id. at 10.
3Following the end of the Cold War, the UN has developed a new aggressive role in its 
peacekeeping efforts. Military-style enforcement actions such as the humanitarian 
interventions in Somalia, Iraq and recently in East Timor and situations like Bosnia, where a 
traditional peacekeeping mission6 involves an escalating use of force, must be anticipated as 
peacekeeping7 and peacemaking8 operations blend together in humanitarian interventions. 
The arena of peacekeeping has evolved from the use of force only in self-defence and a 
goodwill presence authorised by host government to active military action by UN authorised 
international forces against aggressive governments. With the practice of the Security Council 
during interventions in Iraq and Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and more recently in East 
Timor, humanitarian interventions have taken on a new role in collective international use of 
force through 'police' action. The Security Council's authorisation to use force, in part to 
combat the 'widespread and flagrant' violations of international humanitarian law, has resulted 
in the gradual embossment of peace enforcement over peacekeeping missions as evidenced by 
6
 Traditional peacekeeping normally occurs in the aftermath of cross-border disagreements or conflicts where the 
belligerents have either fought themselves to exhaustion or have lost their appetite for conflict. At that point, the 
UN sends in military personnel to separate hostile forces and/or monitor borders, ceasefires, or force movements. 
These lightly armed peacekeepers operate with the consent of all involved and with strict concern for 
impartiality and minimising interference in any States domestic affairs. This was the original non-offensive 
peacekeeping operation fashioned by Dag Hammarskjold, preventive rather than corrective solutions to keep 
great powers out of peripheral crises and thus forestall their escalation.
7
 Symbolising the new post-Cold War spirit, in January 1992 the UN Security Council met for the first time ever 
at the level of heads of State or government. The summit asked the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to 
prepare a keynote strategy document for UN peace operations in the new era. Entitled An Agenda for Peace, 
above note 1  it set out to define more diverse and robust roles for the UN. Two proposed departures from 
previous practice were critical. First, it defined peacekeeping as ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in 
the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned’ (para 20). Here was a clear signal that the UN 
might, in some instances, seek to deploy peacekeepers without local consent. Second, the document noted that 
ceasefires had often been agreed to in the past but not complied with, making it necessary for the UN to try and 
restore a ceasefire. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council consider the utilisation of 
peace-enforcement units (para 44). Here the Secretary General was calling for a new United Nations military 
role (a quasi-enforcement role) altogether, beyond traditional peacekeeping (non-offensive military presence).
8
 ‘Peacemaking’ is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those 
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter. Agenda for Peace, above note 1, at para. 20. Peacemaking differs from 
traditional peacekeeping in breadth and depth or both. It differs in at least two ways. One is that the UN now 
engages in preventive deployment in that it places a robust force along a border or ‘hotspot’ before a crisis even 
4the subsequent expansion of the mandates of UNOSOM and UNPROFOR.9
While the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence continue to 
play a pivotal role in international relations today, they have been weakened by the numerous 
international treaty obligations that States have taken on, as well as the growing idea that 
through collective UN authorisation, governments have the right to 'intervene' when a human 
rights violation might threaten international peace.  In addition, there has developed a norm 
that member States of the UN have the responsibility to ensure that human rights violations in 
other States are addressed. The growing body of human rights law and the developing practice 
of the UN Security Council's Article 39 determinations in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and recently 
in East Timor that led to forcible interventions all point to an emerging customary norm of 
UN humanitarian intervention in member States where the humanitarian violations are severe 
and have the slightest transboundary effect. 10 As the Security Council liberalises the finding 
of 'threat to the peace' to include non-military threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian 
interventions will also increase. 11
occurs. A second way is when the UN involves itself in intraState affairs by helping new or collapsed States set 
up governmental structures and maintain law and order. 
9
 UNOSOM-United Nations Operation in Somalia, established by SC Resolution 751, 24 April 1992; 
UNPROFOR-United Nations Protection Force, established by UN SC Resolution 776, February 1992.
10
 Iraq-SC Resolution 688, 5 April 1991; Somalia- SC Resolution 794, 3 December 1992; Bosnia-SC Resolution 
836, 4 June 1992; East Timor-SC Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.
11
 During the post-Cold War era, a number of UN sanctioned military operations have been carried out in the 
name of humanitarianism. This involves coercive military interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a 
sovereign State motivated or legitimated by a commitment to promote international order and human rights. The 
Security Council has linked humanitarian crises to the right to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter inorder 
to restore international peace and security. As the Secretary-general notes in Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Work of the Organisation, GA, 54th Sess., Sup. No.1 (A/54/1) there is need to protect civilians in armed 
conflict, facilitate access to humanitarian assistance and address the flouting of humanitarian norms (para 191). It 
should be noted that Oppeinheim laid out authoritatively intervention in light of the territorial supremacy of 
States by virtue of State sovereignty. He defined intervention as ‘dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs 
of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things. He noted that such 
intervention can take place by right or without right. While intervention is as a rule forbidden by the Family of 
Nations, Oppeinheim analysed instances in which intervention without right (forcible intervention) can be 
5The ‘New World Order,’ which envisions collective police actions by the members of the 
international community, presents an alternative to the traditional wars of self-defence. The 
Security Council can authorise enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
ranging from economic sanctions (under Article 41), to collective military action (under 
Article 42). Article 39 states that ‘the Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.’12 Although collective action would usually take the 
form of global action, authorised under Article 42, it could also be implemented by regional 
organisations, authorised under Article 53.13 Thus, under the new world order, the UN will
‘police’ wars by getting involved at the outset of conflicts and enforcing peace through the 
measures authorised under Chapter VII. 14 This erosion of the principle of non-intervention 
set forth by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has contributed, in part, to the increase in UN 
interventions in the post-Cold War world, which in turn has occasionally led to complex 
admissible or excusable. Among the basic criteria that Oppeinheim sets out for admissible intervention is, to 
enforce international treaty obligations in a delinquent State and, in the case of violation by a State of universally 
recognised principles of the Law of Nations whether violations occurred in time of war or peace. He emphasised 
that the Law of Nations recognises the rule that ‘interventions in the interests of humanity are admissible 
provided they are exercised in the form of a collective intervention of the Powers’ noting that intervention is a de 
facto matter of policy, not constrained by any hard and fast rules. In present time in view of Oppenheim’s 
analysis, UN sanctioned multinational humanitarian interventions premised on promotion of international peace 
and security, and protection of human rights in States violating international norms are thus justifiable as these 
are interests common to all members of the international community, and laid down in international conventional 
and customary law. See L. Oppeinheim, International Law: A Treatise (Peace) (1905) 81-91.
12 UN Charter, above note 1.
13
 T.M. Franck and F. Patel, ‘Agora: The Gulf Crisis In International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police 
Action in Lieu of War: ‘the Old Order Changeth’ (1991) 85 Am.J. Int’l L  63.
14
 Cf. S. Hoffman, ‘Delusions of World Order’ N.Y. Rev of Books, Apr.9, 1992 at 37 (noting the difficulty of 
establishing ‘world order’ given the distinction  between international and domestic legitimacy, and advocating a 
limited strategy for peacekeeping centred in the United Nations).
6operations that include elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.15
With the end of the Cold War, the ideological barrier between the ‘East’ and ‘West’, which 
for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility, and had prevented the United Nations from 
doing the job for which it was created -global collective security 16crumbled. In the post-Cold 
War era the ability of the Security Council to achieve ‘Great Power Unanimity’17 on 
operations authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter (to maintain or restore international 
peace and security once peace has been threatened or breached) has enabled the UN to carve
out a much broader security role by acting as a watchdog over international disputes, a 
peacemaker and peacekeeper after the event of conflict, and a facilitator of disarmament and 
peaceful dispute resolution under Chapter VI of the Charter.18 As the number of both formal 
UN peacekeeping operations as well as other UN authorised missions increases, it is 
important to note that in the 1990s, UN missions had a chequered existence with instances of 
violations of international humanitarian law by UN troops.19 The rules of engagement and 
field operations by UN forces must be modified and articulately enunciated. The stakes are 
high; the credibility of the UN missions,20 the accountability of UN troops to international 
humanitarian law standards and the adherence to the international rule-of-law regime 
15
 Peace enforcement is where a specific act of aggression, or more general set of hostile actions, are collectively 
identified as a threat to international peace and security, and the aggressor State is subjected to an array of 
sanctions until its violation is reversed. Ultimately, enforcement can involve flat-out war-the ‘all necessary 
means’ of SC Resolution 678, authorising what became Operation Desert Storm.
16
 See generally, W. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping 2 (1993) 1.
17 UN Charter, Article 27(3).
18
 See generally, A.V. Patil, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990: A Complete Record And Case Histories of 
the Security Council’s Veto (1992) 14.
19
 See the discussion in  Part II of this article.
20
 UNOSOM faced a dramatic loss of international and local credibility in Somalia in relation to standards (or 
lack of them) applied in dealing with the public security function. See also, below note 31 which notes the 
conduct of a number of UN troops in the Bulgarian contingent that displayed a lack of discipline as well as 
ethics.
7envisioned in the drive to establish the permanent International Criminal Court.21
This article focuses on the issue of holding the UN accountable for violations of international 
humanitarian law by UN forces. While the UN has acknowledged that international 
humanitarian law applies to UN forces, a general policy that leaves enforcement to States to 
which the UN troops belong does not guarantee justice for the victims of international 
humanitarian violations in the face of competing national political and international justice 
interests. 22  This is discussed later in the article. Holding the UN accountable for international 
humanitarian law violations by troops serving under its command can only be achieved by the 
UN directly possessing the rights and duties under international humanitarian law,23 thus 
making this rights and duties binding on the UN as a concerned subject and to whom the law 
really intends them to be addressed.24 Because rules of international law are formulated in 
such an elliptical way, they transpose from the subject to the objects concerned, in this case 
from the UN to the individual troops involved in UN military operations.
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 37 ILM 999 (not yet in 
force)[hereinafter Rome Statute], adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. The final vote recorded was 120 in favour, 
seven against and 20 abstentions. As at 1 January 2000, there were 89 signatures and four ratifications.
22Section 4, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations of International Humanitarian Law, 6 
August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/13 (Secretary-General’s Bulletin). The Secretary-General’s Bulletin is to be viewed 
as enshrinement of the observance of international humanitarian law in UN military operations as a matter of 
authoritative reaffirmation of UN policy. The Bulletin entered into force on 12 August 199. The Secretary-
General’s Bulletin does not mark the first time in the acceptance of applicability of international humanitarian 
law to UN military  operations. The applicability of humanitarian laws was recognised as early as 1991 in the 
Model Agreement Between The United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Annex to Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 
A/64/185, 23 May 1991, Article X, ‘Applicability of international conventions’ para 28 (Model Agreement).
23
 This will fulfil the lex specialis, so that whenever UN troops act, international humanitarian law will apply de 
jure. In other words the law specifically expressed in the relevant instruments will regulate the given situation. 
This is as opposed to a  general UN policy that ‘[t]he fundamental principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law…are applicable to United Nations forces…’ See Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above note 22.
24
 This will ensure that the UN is bound by certain parts of international humanitarian law that lack opinio juris 
and only apply to State Parties. See generally e.g. Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in 
Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (1999) 149-181.
8II. THE PANDORA’S BOX: A CASE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
     HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS BY UN TROOPS IN SOMALIA
1. Introduction
This section of the article will look at the documented international humanitarian law 
violations by UN troops in the UN sanctioned peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM25 as a case 
study and will highlight the failure of national adjudicative mechanisms26 to guarantee justice 
to the victims of violations.27 This singular focus on UNOSOM28 is in no way to suggest that 
no other international humanitarian law violations have occurred in any other UN mission29
but rather because this particular humanitarian law violation allegations were also supported 
by the testimonies of fellow troops, by photographic evidence30 in some instances and 
25
 See, UNOSOM, above note 10.
26
 This is the method of enforcement of international humanitarian law among UN forces that has been endorsed 
by the UN in section 4 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above note 22. Yet the short history of enforcement 
of international humanitarian law violations by States has already demonstrated a lack of political will and great 
reluctance of States to prosecute their troops as discussed further in this section of the article.
27
 The article will focus on Belgium and Italy. The Canadian contingent was also implicated in the violations 
which resulted in the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group battalion (CARBG) and the 
prosecution of two soldiers who were part of the battalion for the death of a Somali youth in UN custody. See, 
Amnesty International News, Vol. 27, No. 5, September 1997, at 1.
28
 Ibid.
29
 Most notable were the allegations relating to international humanitarian law violations by Dutch troops who 
formed part of the UNPROFOR contingent. See generally, Reuters, ‘Dutch Soul-Searching Over Srebrenica’ 
August 17, 1998, online <http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081710.html>; Andrew Kelly, ‘Tribunal 
Hears How UN Troops Abandoned Srebenica Victims’ August 24, 1998, 
online<http://linder.com/trbunal_html>. The history however  stretches further back to UNTAC where damage 
was done by the troops of the Bulgarian contingent who were amnestied convicts and whose discipline was 
highly suspect. See, e.g., J.E. Heinnger, Peacekeeping in Transition-The UN in Cambodia (1994) 75-76.
30
 In the case of the laws of war allegations against the Dutch contingent in UNPROFOR, a roll of film 
(containing photos taken by Captain Ron Rutten) allegedly showing Dutch UN peacekeepers helping Bosnian 
Serbs round up and single out Bosnian Moslems was destroyed in the process of development by military police 
in what was termed as ‘accidental’. See, Agence France Presse,’ Former Dutch Minister Denies Destroying War 
Crimes Evidence’ August 12, 1998,online <http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081210.html>; Reuters, 
‘Dutch Focus on Possible Srebenica Cover-up’ August 13, 1998, online 
<http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081310.html>.
9concerned States did establish investigative/judicial commissions31 to look into the allegations 
and some of the troops did in fact get prosecuted for their acts and even in one case, an entire 
battalion was disbanded as a result of the allegations of its actions that degraded and abused 
the rights of Somalis.32
In March and April 1997, the press published the allegations of a former Belgian paratrooper 
that human rights abuses had been committed against Somali citizens by members of the 
Belgian armed forces who served in the multinational task force operating in Somalia in 1993. 
The allegations were accompanied by photographs, one of which showed two uniformed 
soldiers swinging a Somali boy over an open fire and was accompanied by the claim of the 
former paratrooper that such behaviour was a regular practice in the paratroopers camp and 
that the boy in this case had been threatened with being burnt alive. The ex-paratrooper also 
made allegations partly supported by photographic evidence, that a Somali child had been 
forcibly fed with salt water and possibly pork (a prohibited food for Muslims) until he 
vomited and was made to eat his own vomit. Photographs also showed a soldier urinating on 
the inanimate body of a Somali man lying on the ground, with a foot pressed on the man’s 
body, and of soldiers holding a Somali man by his hair.33 There were also allegations that 
around 23 October 1993 a child caught stealing food had been locked in a container, in 
31
 Italy established two investigative commissions, the first in May 1997 was a military commission headed by 
General Vanucchi, the second in June was a judicial commission headed by Etore Gallo. In Belgium, an 
administrative investigative tribunal was established by the Ministry of Defence headed by an army general. See, 
below note 34 at 1; Amnesty International Report 1998: Belgium; Amnesty International, below note 31, at 10.
32
 See, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), above note 27.
33
 Amnesty International, ‘AI Concerns in Europe: January-June 1997’ AI Index EUR 01/06/97 (1997) 1.
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stifling heat, without food or drink, for two days and two nights, that its cries of distress were 
ignored and that when the container was opened the child was found to be dead.34
In May 1997, Michele Patruno, an Italian who had served as a conscript in Somalia, claimed 
that during 1993 Italian soldiers had kept prisoners for interrogation tied up in the sun and 
deprived of water, or given only spicy food to increase their thirst. If they refused to talk, they 
were subjected to blows, burning cigarettes applied to the soles of their feet, electric shocks to 
the body, including to the testicles, or were thrown against razor wire fences. His allegations 
were supported by photographs depicting soldiers apparently preparing to apply electrodes to 
the body of a young Somali man lying half-naked on the ground.35
Between June and August 1997, a number of former Italian paratroopers also made public 
allegations sometimes supported by photographic evidence, that in 1993 and 1994 while 
serving as part of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, they had witnessed colleagues 
torturing and ill-treating Somalis. In some cases the treatment was said to have resulted in 
death. Somalis and Somali human rights monitors made similar allegations.36
34
 Ibid.
35
 Ibid. at 3.
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2. Holding the UN Troops Accountable for International Humanitarian Law Violations
    Under the National Adjudicative Process37
(a) Belgium
In Belgium, judicial investigations were promptly opened into the allegations by the military 
authorities (auditorat militaire) and resulted in two former paratroopers being tried before a 
military court in June in connection with the treatment of the Somali boy held over the open 
fire. On 30 June 1997 the court acquitted both men of the charges of assault and battery and of 
using threats (coups et blessures volontaires avec menaces). The military prosecutor, who had 
requested a sentence and a fine of 10,000 Belgian francs for each of the defendants reportedly 
lodged an appeal. A sergeant was due to stand trial before a military court on 8 September 
1997 in connection with the alleged forcible feeding of a Somali child and, reportedly, a 
sergeant major was to stand trial in September 1997, apparently on suspicion of having killed 
the Somali on whose body he was photographed urinating.38
Following the publication of further allegations and the photographs the Minister of Defence 
ordered a broader, administrative, investigation, carried out by an army general heading the 
Operational Command of the Belgian Ground Forces.39 In July 1997, Amnesty International 
sought further information about several trials, which reportedly took place during 1994 and 
1995 concerning soldiers prosecuted in connection with alleged human rights violations in 
Somalia. The trials followed an inquiry into the conduct of Belgian forces in Somalia, carried 
36
 Amnesty International, ‘ITALY: A Briefing for the UN Committee Against Torture’ AI Index EUR 30/02/99, 
(May 1995) 10.
37
 National adjudicative process is used here to denote both civilian court process and military tribunals.
38
 Amnesty International, above note 33, at 1.
39
 Ibid.
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out in 1993 by a Commission of Inquiry composed of three regular army officers and a 
civilian assistant to the Minister of Defence.40 The reports included:
•acquittal in December 1994 of two soldiers accused of manslaughter (homicide involontaire) 
of two Somali men and a third accused of assaulting a Somali woman. The sentences were 
apparently appealed.
•the issuing of verdicts in January 1995 following the trial of three soldiers in connection with 
the fatal shooting of two Somali men and with alleged illegal trafficking in arms and ivory.
•suspended sentences to two soldiers who (while drunk) had kicked, punched and subjected a 
handcuffed Somali prisoner to electric shocks.
•the trial in October 1995 of a group of 16 soldiers accused to varying degrees of threatening 
and ill-treating Somali citizens mainly children, in spring 1993.
•on 31 October 1995 a military tribunal apparently acquitted nine officers, suspended 
judgment (suspension du pronounce) in the case of another six and sentenced one officer to 
eight days’ suspended imprisonment for subjecting two children to mock execution. 41
(b) Italy
In early June 1997, the Italian government announced that the army had opened an internal 
administrative investigation into the conduct of the armed forces in Somalia, overseen by 
army General Vannuchi, and that the military prosecutor’s office in Rome had opened judicial 
40
 Ibid at 2.
41
 Ibid.
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investigations into specific alleged human rights violations. A number of cases were 
subsequently transferred to civilian prosecutors for further investigation. In mid-June 1997 a 
Ministry of Defence decree established a five-member government Commission of Inquiry to 
look into the conduct of Italian troops, composed of military and civilian members and led by 
Ettore Gallo, a former Constitutional Court President. Before submitting what was intended as 
its conclusive report to the government in August 1997, the so-called Gallo Commission, 
accompanied by members of the magistracy, gathered information in Italy, Ethiopia and 
Kenya. It interviewed 141 people, including a small number of Somalis, but did not visit 
Somalia.42
The Commission concluded that the overall conduct of the Italian troops in Somalia had been 
good, that specific violations were carried out at the level of the ranks without involvement of 
professional senior officers. Within days of the report being lodged, new information came to 
light about further human rights violations by Italian troops in Somalia, accompanied by 
claims that high ranking army officers had been aware of them and had not intervened to 
prevent them. The Minister of Defence asked the Gallo Commission to reopen its inquiry. In 
May 1998 the Commission submitted its second report 43 which indicated it had interviewed 
11 Somalis flown to Italy in January 1997 but had not carried out on-site investigations in 
Somalia. The Commission concluded that episodes of violence were ‘sporadic and localised’, 
not ‘widespread and general’. Some middle-ranking officers were blamed for not having 
known what the men in their charge were doing. The Commission addressed specific episodes 
42
 Amnesty International, above note 36 at 10.
43 Relazione Conclusiva, 26 May 1998.
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of alleged human rights violations by the armed forces in Somalia and laid them out on the 
basis of credible, probably true, undecided as to the veracity and not considered credible.44
In a letter to Amnesty International dated 17 September 1997 the Minister of Justice stated 
that Public Prosecutors attached to first instance courts in Livorno and Pescara (La Procure 
della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Livorno e presso il Pretura di Pescara) had initiated 
five proceedings in connection with Italian soldiers accused of various alleged offences, 
including sexual assault of Somali women (the Minister did not specify the number of women 
involved); deliberate infliction of injuries leading unintentionally to death of Somali citizens 
(the Minister did not specify the number of citizens involved); the infliction of ill-treatment 
and physical injuries(again, the Minister did not specify the number of Somali citizens 
involved), and theft with violence from a Somali woman.45
When the Gallo Commission lodged its second report with the Italian government on 22 May 
1998, the Ministry of Defence announced that by that date some five disciplinary sanctions 
had been issued at ministry level (sanzioni di stato) and seven had been issued at army 
command level (sanzioni di corpo). These sanctions apparently entailed punishments ranging 
from formal reprimands to temporary suspension from service and confinement to barracks.46
44
 Amnesty International, above note 36, at 10-11. It is interesting to note that the tenor of the report focused 
singularly on the credibility of the alleged international humanitarian law violations and did not in any way focus 
on the possible guilt of the Italian troops. Interesting, the Commission, made up of military officers as well as 
jurists and chaired by a senior Italian judge did not use any legal standard notably the weight of evidence in 
general relation to the particular offences alleged.
45
 ‘-atti di libidine violenta ed atti osceni in luogo pubblico (artt 521, 527, e 582 cp) in danno di donne somale
-omicidio preterintezionale in danno di cittadini Somali (artt 575, 582 e 584 cp)
-maltrattamenti, lesioni personali e violenza privata (artt 572, 582, 585, 576 e 610 cp)
-furto aggravato (artt 624 e 625 cp) in danno di cittadina somala’
46
 Amnesty International, above note 36, at 14.
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3. The Failings of Justice in the Face of Competing National Political Interests and 
International Justice Interests
While the nature of sentences issued to the various guilty troops in the two countries is of 
interest, this article will not look into the legal adequacy of ministerial sanctions and army 
command reprimands for troops charged with sexual assault, infliction of injuries leading to 
unintentional death and torture of prisoners47 but will rather focus on general aspects of the 
disciplinary processes in both countries that demonstrate that the investigation and subsequent 
judicial proceedings were clearly biased in favour of the accused troops. At a glance, it is 
unjust for a soldier accused of manslaughter not to be subjected to a criminal trial but to 
instead get of with a ministerial sanction or a soldier accused of sexual assault to get of with 
an army command reprimand.48
Firstly, in both governments, no consideration seems to have been given to a comprehensive 
inquiry independent of the military, into alleged human rights abuses in order to ensure a 
demonstrably impartial examination of facts as advocated under the UN Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment49 and under the 
UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
47
 Ibid. at 13 which reports  the general contents of a letter dated September 17, 1997 from the Italian Minister  
of Justice in response to Amnesty International inquiries for specifics of criminal proceedings undertaken and 
copies of the verdicts. See also, Amnesty International Report 1999: Italy (1999) 3.
48
 Ibid.
49
 Adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1984, came into force on 26 June 1987,UNTS 1465, 85. It 
has 66 signatories and 119 parties. Given the present state of the lex lata, torture is a recognised crime in 
international law. It is prohibited by a number of international instruments, some of which form part of 
customary international law. Article 3 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, below note 66 
(recognised as part of customary international law) prohibits parties from committing at any time or in any place 
acts of ‘violence to life and person,…mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture’ or ‘outrages against human dignity, 
in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment’. Other instruments prohibiting torture are the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5), 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), 
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Summary Executions.50 Both countries are signatories to the former and come within the 
auspices of the latter as members of the UN. Instead, there was a combination of civilian and 
military mechanisms without delineation as to criteria in determining investigative and/or 
sentencing scope of cases by the military and civilian adjudicative mechanisms especially 
with regard to matters of a criminal nature. Essentially, then, a loophole was created that in 
the writer’s opinion allowed troops who should have been subject to criminal trial for inter 
alia manslaughter, sexual assault, etc to be subjected to the lower standard within the 
framework of the military internal disciplinary mechanism.51 This procedure facilitated the 
accused to escape justice with reprimands, fines, and dishonourable discharge. 
Secondly, the biases of investigations need to be discussed. Military-high ranking generals 
and civilian personnel-government bureaucrats, were involved as investigators. Both groups 
had certain specific interests to protect. For the military, the armed forces reputation was at 
stake, for the government bureaucrats, the country’s international image. For instance, the 
Gallo Commission in its first report concluded that the overall conduct of the Italian troops 
had been good, it exonerated senior professional officers in its first report. However, 
subsequent evidence implicated the officers who had been exonerated.52 Even then, the 
Commission in its second report submitted in broad and vague terms that ‘[a]t the highest 
level ,[which the Commission did not define] there was an inability to foresee that certain 
events might occur and a failure to make checks which might have ensured that repeatedly-
1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish torture (Article 2), 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (Article 5). 
50Principles are a species of soft law hence not legally binding. But, they contain general binding obligations on 
States which usually reflect other legally binding obligations assumed by States in multilateral treaties. 
51
 Ibid. See also Amnesty international, above note 33 at 1: Amnesty international, above note 36 at 10. 
52
 Ibid. note 36, at 10.
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given orders and instructions were applied’. Further the Commission did not bother to carry 
on-site investigations in Somalia even in light of the new evidence and allegations.53
Thirdly, most of the trials were in military courts. While it is beyond the scope of this article 
to delve into the criminal law structure of the two countries, the writer will state that 
generally, the military courts ruled on matters based on internal military disciplinary 
procedures and did not refer cases of a criminal nature to civilian courts for criminal trials 
which would entail criminal penalties. Thus, the soldiers faced the tribunals most probably on 
charges of failing to conduct themselves according to the army manual rather than the 
violation of human rights of their victims. Proof of this as essentially an internal disciplinary 
matter seems to be borne out by the nature of sentences-temporary suspension of service, 
confinement to barracks and army command reprimands.54 Further, there is no information to 
suggest that any of the troops’ victims or other witnesses (Somali citizens) ever appeared 
before the military tribunals even though it was within the power of the respective 
governments to trace a good number of them down and bring them for testimony before the 
tribunals. 
Lastly, there seemed to be a broader governmental conspiracy in the sense that that all briefs 
and ministerial reports were long on recommendations but short on specific details. For 
instance on 8 July 1997 the Belgian Minister of Defence highlighted to parliament certain 
findings. The report recommended better selection of candidates, improved training, including 
educating soldiers and disseminating information on humanitarian law. It also indicated that 
excessive delays in disciplinary proceedings and a problem of alcohol abuse in the army 
53
 Ibid at 11
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needed to be addressed. The minister of Defence added that he wished to set up an 
independent inquiry on racism within the army.55 Requests by concerned parties for 
information on specificity of verdicts issued elicited no response or were referred to the 
Byzantine maze of government bureaucracy.56 Evidently, the governments were more eager to 
give the impression that something was being done rather than affirmative action to ensure 
proper prosecution of accused troops. For instance in a letter dated 17 September 1997, by 
Italy’s Minister of Justice in response to Amnesty International’s call for an effective 
complaints mechanism for Somalis as the present mechanism was deemed inadequate, the 
Minister stated ‘in the Italian system anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, is allowed access 
to the justice system in order to protect their own interests whether in the civil or criminal 
area.’57 How the affected Somalis living in a country decimated by civil strife and without a 
central government were expected to gain access to Italy’s justice system is left to 
imagination. The trials that did take place were evidently a public relations exercise that made 
a mockery of justice.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: HOW CAN THE UN BE HELD 
           ACCOUNTABLE FOR VIOLATIONS BY ITS FORCES?
This section of the article is an inquiry into whether the United Nations can be held 
accountable for the violation of the international humanitarian law by forces under its 
command during Security Council authorised action to maintain international peace and 
54
 Ibid at 14.
55
 Amnesty International, ‘AI Concerns in Europe: January-June 1998’ AI Index EUR 01/02/98 (September 
1998) 11-12, also Amnesty International, above note 36, at 11
56
 See generally Amnesty International documents, AI Index EUR 01/01/98; AI Index 01/02/98
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security.58 Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
and Land59 lays down the qualifications of ‘belligerents,’ that of groups entitled to take part in 
armed conflict. Key among this is command, distinctive emblem, open bearing of arms and 
the requirement of adherence to the laws and customs of war. It is important to bear in mind 
that the Hague Laws are part of customary international law.60 While it is easy for 
international armed forces acting under the auspices of the UN to fulfil this criteria, an 
important ingredient is whether they qualify to be classed as ‘belligerents’ in their operations. 
The important thing though to be borne in mind is that in peace enforcement, UN troops do 
militarily intervene in the territory of States notwithstanding that they do so without the 
intention of being active combatants. The issue of belligerence of UN operations will be 
considered in the next part of the article which discusses whether the laws of war which are 
binding upon the States who are members of the United Nations, are binding as well upon the 
Organisation itself.
2. The Laws of War
An Overview of The Hague and Geneva Regimes
The rules of Public International Law regulating the conduct of those armed conflicts defined 
57
 ‘Per quanto attiene alla possibilita di adottare meccanismi per consentire ai cittadini Somali di disporre di 
strumenti legali,Le rappresento che nell’ordinamento italiano e consentio a chiunque, cittaedino o straniero, 
l’accesso alla giurisdizione per la tutela dei propri interessi in ambito sia civile che penale.’
58The question of whether the laws of war apply during the peacekeeping operations which have been 
transforming into peacemaking operations where the use of force has been necessary (Somalia, Yugoslavia) 
seems to have been settled. In 6 August 1999 the UN released the Secretary- General’s Bulletin on Observance 
by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, above note 22, Section 1 at para 1.1 which states: 
‘The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are 
applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are engaged therein as combatants, 
to the extent and for the duration of the engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or 
in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.’
59
 D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Law of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other 
Documents (1988) 75-92.
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as ‘international’ are often referred to as the jus in bello, and are distinguished from the jus ad
bellum, which regulates and restricts the rights of international legal entities (particularly 
States) to use armed force against one another.61The Hague and Geneva Conventions form the 
core of international humanitarian law. 
The Hague and Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties which state the laws of war as 
general principles of conduct.62 Treaties such as the Hague and Geneva conventions, and 
military manuals in various States are not, therefore, the sources of the laws of war, but rather 
the codification of customary international law.63 Thus, although non-signatory nations are 
not bound by the precise wording and detailed prescriptions of the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions, they are regarded as bound by the customary laws of war from which the 
treaties are derived.64
60
 See Secretary-General’s Commentary, below note 63.
61
 R.H.F. Austin, ‘The Law of International Armed Conflict’ in M. Bedjaoui (ed) International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects (1991) 765. 
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‘In all of these treaties, the laws of war are stated as general priciples of conduct, and neither the means of 
enforcement nor the penalties for violations are specified.’ T. Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American 
Tragedy (1970) 23.
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‘part of the conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international 
customary law’ is the law of armed conflict embodied in: the Geneva Conventions for the  Protection of War 
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37, 32 ILM at 1170.
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 This was clearly recognised in the Preamble to  Hague Convention (IV) of 1907, which States that questions 
not covered by the Convention should be resolved by ‘the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the 
usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public 
conscience.’ The substance of the provisions of laws of war has been taken into the military law of many 
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above note 62 at 23, citing the 1914 US army field manual. Similar language is found in Article 158 of Geneva
Convention III, below note 66, which addresses  the protection of civilian persons in times of war, where it is 
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The Hague and Geneva Conventions embody the laws of war, referred to as the jus in bello. 
The Hague Conventions are a series of treaties concluded at the Hague in 1907, which 
primarily regulate the behaviour of belligerents in war and neutrality,65 whereas the Geneva
Conventions are a series of treaties concluded in Geneva between 1864 and 1949, which 
concern the protection of the victims of armed conflict.66 In 1977 two Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which further developed the protection of victims in international armed 
conflicts and expanded protection to victims of non-international armed conflict, were opened 
for signature. Whether or not these two additional protocols have been incorporated into the 
corpus of international customary law is still a subject of intense debate.67
Together, the Hague and Geneva Conventions embody the rules which govern the (1) laws on 
the use and types of weapons; (2) laws on warfare, including rules on permissible tactics and 
‘principles of the law of nations,’ which are then described in the same words used in the Hague Convention.  
The International Military Tribunal overseeing the Nuremberg Trials echoed a similar viewpoint: ‘The law of 
war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of States which gradually obtained 
universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice…This law is not static, but by continual 
adaptation follows the needs for a changing world.’ Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg.
65
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Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
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 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and  relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol II). As of December 31, 10 
years after its signing, Additional Protocol I had 71 parties as against 165 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
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strategies on legitimate targets; and (3) humanitarian rules.68 These rules attempt to limit, in 
the name of humanity, the conduct which is directly related to war hostilities in progress 
between organised belligerent forces to that which is actually necessary for military 
purposes.69And, although the traditional laws of war were understood in pre-modernised 
international law to apply essentially between States, under the modern international law, 
embodied in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the jus in bello, similar to other parts of the 
law, applies in certain circumstances to other recognised entities as well. For example, the 
effective realities made it  necessary to subject conflicts within States to the jus in bello on the 
basis of subjective recognition of rebel forces as belligerents.70
 An Overview of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals
Two international tribunals were established following World War II, at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo to try major war criminals. The decision of the Allies in World War II to try individual 
Nazis before the IMT for violations of international law was the turning point in modern 
history concerning the relationship between individuals and international law.71 They carved 
out in stone the basic international criminal law philosophy that even in the international 
arena with a multitude of different entities and collectivities, ‘[c]rimes against international 
law are committed  by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’72
68
 I. D. De Lupis, The Law of War (1987) 129.
69
 Taylor, above note 62 at 30, 34. 
70
 See Austin, above note 61 at 765.
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 M. W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law (1993) 246.
72 Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg. See Taylor, above note 62, at 78-94.
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It is important to note that the principles by which the above tribunals guided themselves were
recognised in 1946 by the General Assembly of the United Nations as principles of 
substantive and  procedural international criminal law.73 The judgments of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal were meant to establish plainly and forcefully that the rules of public international 
law should and do apply to individuals; they were also intended to demonstrate that the 
protection of human rights was too important a matter to be left entirely to States, a 
proposition already enunciated in the Preamble and Article 55 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
Efforts to prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes did not end 
with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Sadly, however, more than forty years were to 
elapse before the community of nations revisited the issue of enforcement of international 
criminal law by international judicial process. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council 
called for the establishment of an ad hoc international war-crimes tribunal to prosecute those 
accused of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.74 It was established as an enforcement 
measure under the binding authority of Chapter VII, rather than through a treaty which would 
have created an international criminal court whose jurisdiction would be subject to the 
consent of the States concerned.75 Subsequently, a second international criminal tribunal 
73
 The resolution of the 51st plenary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of December 11, 
1946, cited in M.C. Bassiouni & V.P. Nanda (eds.)  A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973) (Vol. 2) 
43.
74
 For the Statute of the tribunal, see Report of Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 and Annex (May 3, 1993), reprinted in ILM 1159, 1192 (1993).
75
 See T. Meron, ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law’(1994) 88 Am.J.Int’l L.
78, 79.
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modelled along that of the former Yugoslavia was established for Rwanda.76 The 
establishment of the tribunals also invoked a response from the Security Council to move 
forward on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.77 This two tribunals 
played an important role in fuelling the drive to the permanent International Criminal Court78
as they stood as a living testimony to the legal and technical viability of judicial enforcement 
of international humanitarian law.
3. The Applicability of the Laws of War to the United Nations?
(a) The International Legal Personality of the United Nations
For the United Nations to be held responsible for a violation of the laws of war, it must 
possess sufficient international legal personality. Legal personality is possessed by those 
entities with the status of being capable of bearing legal rights and duties in a given legal 
system.79 States are the traditional subjects of international law based on the principle of 
‘territorial sovereignty.’80 In the twentieth century, international organisations have been 
widely received as having international legal personality.81 A State, or other international 
76
 The crimes committed during the conflict in Rwanda made the Security Council decide by resolution 955 of 8 
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For Genocide and Other Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Laws Committed In The Territory of 
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77 Rome Statute, above note 21.
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legal person, may be held responsible only to the extent that it has rights and duties which it is 
free to exercise; and some have more than others.82
Just as a State has the right under international law to assert an international claim for 
damages when another State fails to live up to certain minimum standards for safety of its 
nationals, vis-a-vis forces representing the United Nations, the Organisation assumes 
responsibility only to the extent that such forces become an organ of the UN and therefore 
subject to its exclusive operational control.83 Thus, when in 1948 a Swedish national acting as 
a United Nations mediator in the Middle East was killed while performing his UN duties in 
Palestine, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of The United Nations, held that if in the performance of his 
duties, an agent of the UN suffers injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a 
State, the United Nations as an organisation has the capacity to bring an international claim 
against the responsible de jure or de facto Government with a view to obtaining the reparation 
due in  respect of damage caused to the victim or to his successors in title. 84 This case, 
therefore, established that the United Nations has the capacity to bring a claim with a view of 
obtaining reparations due in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations, and to the 
victim or to persons entitled through him, regardless of whether the respondent State is a 
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between 
International Organisations, March 21, 1986, UN Doc. A/CONF. 129/15, reprinted in ILM 543 (1986). This 
treaty is not yet in force but is an important indicator of the acceptance of  the attribution of international legal 
personality to international organisations.
82
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in R.S. Simmonds, Legal Problems Arising From The United Nations Military Operations in the Congo (1968) 
229.
83
 Id.,Simmonds, at 229.
84 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (April 11)  
(Reparation Case).
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member of the UN. In reaching this decision the Court concluded that the United Nations is 
an international person, a subject of international law capable of possessing international 
rights and duties with the capacity to maintain its right by bringing international claims.85
Thus, it has been established that the United Nations has sufficient international legal 
personality to bring a claim against one of its Members which has caused injury to it by 
breach of the State's international obligation towards it. Rights are not conferred without 
corresponding duties.86 Thus, under the theory of reciprocity, along with the right to bring an 
international claim, the UN also has the responsibility to be held responsible under  
international law for the actions of its agents.87 One must keep in mind, however, that where a 
State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law, 
the rights and duties of an entity, such as the United Nations, must depend upon its purposes 
and functions as specified or implied in its Charter and as developed in practice.88 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined that the United Nations
could not carry out the intentions of its founders without the right to bring an international 
claim.89 Thus, when considering whether the UN has sufficient international personality to be 
held responsible for the laws of war, one must consider whether the functions of the United 
Nations are such that they could not be effectively discharged without such a corresponding 
85
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obligation.90
The applicability of the laws of war to the United Nations does not, however, depend solely 
on the capacity of the UN to be held responsible under international law. When viewed with 
the powers in Chapter VII action there is a (contentious) case to be made that the UN has both 
the capacity and an obligation to engage in international humanitarian law conventions 
regulating armed forces. 91 The UN, in addition to being a subject of international law, must 
be a direct and intended addressee of the rights and duties designated in the laws of war.92 The 
following section discusses to what extent the United Nations peacekeeping forces should be 
bound by the laws of war.
(b). The Belligerent Status of the United Nations
The laws of war as discussed above are codified in international treaties known as the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions. The parties (signatory States) to the conventions are bound by the 
precise wording of these treaties, and the non-signatory States are bound by the customary 
international law from which the treaties are derived. In addition, we have seen that under the 
Nuremberg principles, individuals may also be held responsible for the violation of such laws, 
regardless of the fact of whether they acted as agents of a signatory State. The problem 
regarding the applicability of the laws of war to the United Nations arises from the fact that 
the peacekeeping forces are agents, not of a belligerent party/State in the traditional sense, but 
90
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of an international organisation whose role is to maintain and enforce peace.93
 In a report entitled ‘Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?’ 
presented to the American Society of International Law in 1952 by the Committee on the 
Study of the Legal Problems of the United Nations, its Chairman (Clyde Eagleton), stated 
that: ‘[a] war is fought by a State for its own national interest; United Nations enforcement 
action is on behalf of order and peace among nations . . . War as between States of equal legal 
status has in the past been regarded as honourable; the use of force against the United Nations 
is now to be regarded as an offence against all Members.’ The Eagleton committee concluded 
in its report that due to the different nature of the use of force by the United Nations to 
restrain aggression from war-making by a State, the United Nations should not feel bound by 
all the laws of war, but should select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its purposes.94
It is maintained by some that acceptance of the Charter by Member States meant acceptance 
by them of the superior legal position of the United Nations as regards the use of force and 
that, consequently, the United Nations may apply such rules as it wishes.95 This conclusion 
has found little support and has subsequently been severely criticised. This writer shares the 
opinion of those who argue that the law governing the conduct of warfare arises from a 
fundamental humanitarian need and was not simply framed as a set of rules to permit the 
93
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playing of a game of 'war' between two States.96
In recognition of the fact that the law of war has a legitimate role to play whenever hostilities 
exist, its application in the past has not been confined to declared war between States.97 Under 
common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws of war are made applicable 
not only to all cases of declared war between the parties, but to all other armed conflicts as 
well. Similarly, its application in the present should not be confined to ‘belligerents’ in the 
strictest sense, but to any organised party involved in a conflict. The numerous States that 
have signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have incorporated them within the 
corpus of their legal system as part of the 'Law of the Land'. Therefore the argument that their 
troops acting under the auspices of the United Nations, are not  participating in an 'armed 
conflict' ‘would require the most ingenious casuistry’.98 The UN as an organisation can 
command and deploy forces, which themselves will or may, be engaged in combat or use of 
force as authorised by the UN. From the beginning, the UN was projected as  a potential 
combatant and/or occupying force. This is reflected in Article 1 and Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and, in particular, in the unutilised provisions of Articles 43-50, by which States 
were to assign military forces to the UN.99
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If the United Nations finds its distinction in its status as a superior legal and moral entity, it 
should be held to an even higher standard than those embodied in the current laws of war. The 
argument that the same laws of war should not be applied to all belligerents stems from the 
postulate that laws of war should discriminate between the legal and illegal belligerent.100 The 
proposition that the superior status of the UN exempts it from being bound by the laws of war 
rests on the fact that when the UN acts, it is acting under the consensus of the international 
community.101
The new allegiance among ‘East’102 and ‘West’ has created an increased opportunity for 
international consensus on methods for keeping the peace. It has also prompted the heads of 
State or governments of the permanent members of the Security Council to pledge increased 
support to the United Nations towards the end of creating a more effective United 
Nations.103If one were to conclude that the laws of war do not apply to the United Nations 
because of its unique character, it would mean that as the ‘Big Five’104 transfer their sovereign 
power over their troops to the United Nations, in an effort to rely on the UN as a means to 
their end, they would simultaneously be exempting those troops from adherence to the laws of 
established. In February 1946, the security Council directed the MSC to devise plans for the force as stipulated 
in Article 43. The Committee met some 157 times during the next 15 months, and reached agreements-in-
principle. But by mid-1947, it became clear that its efforts had fallen victim to the escalating Cold War. See 
generally, R.C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the UN and the Search for Postwar Security
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war. However, simply because those troops are acting on behalf of the international 
community (as opposed to a State) and supposedly have the broader aim of enforcing or 
maintaining peace, rather than destroying an enemy to gain political or territorial control, does 
not mean that the unregulated conduct of those troops presents any less of a danger to 
humanity.
The lack of a method for authoritatively and effectively determining that a situation justifies 
the application of the laws of war is a major weakness of the contemporary laws. However, 
with regard to UN forces, the Secretary-General’s Bulletin105 marks an important milestone in 
recognising that the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are 
applicable to UN forces in situations of armed conflict when they are engaged as active 
combatants, enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is 
permitted in self-defence.106 Given the binding nature of Security Council resolutions as a 
type of lex societatis107 on members of the UN, the Security Council should avoid routinely 
adopting mandates that do not provide militarily meaningful guidelines to missions and which 
do not give opportunity for systematic input by troop-contributing States to the design of the 
mandate. Possibility exists to extend the simple broad mandate approach to one that endorses 
or promulgates more prescriptive guidelines for key aspects of UN operations, particularly 
rules of engagement. 
105 Secretary-General’s Bulletin and Model Agreement, above note 22.
106
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4. International Humanitarian Law Violations by UN Troops: Proposed Method for 
      International Accountability 
Given the importance of the assurance that any party involved in hostile conflict adheres to 
the humanitarian rules set forth in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, regardless of the 
nature of their involvement, or their particular status in international law, the United Nations 
needs to take positive action to bind itself to both sets of Conventions. Although there is a 
strong argument that there is no need to take such an action since the United Nations is bound 
by the customary rules embodied in the Conventions, positive steps taken to bind itself to the 
agreements will guarantee that the United Nations is willing to hold its troops to the same 
standards it wishes to hold its members. The United Nations should take advantage of its 
treaty making power to become a signatory party to the treaties.108 Article 1 of the UN 
Charter tasks the organisation to promote and encourage respect for human rights. Such 
promotion and encouragement will hardly be served by the organisation itself attempting to 
avoid responsibility in this area.
This article has previously discussed that the United Nations has sufficient international 
personality to either bring or defend a claim for the breach of an international obligation. 
Another important aspect of international personality is treaty-making capacity. Although all 
entities having treaty- making capacity necessarily have international personality, all 
international persons do not necessarily have treaty-making capacity.109 The United Nations, 
however, has such capacity. Although article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
107
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Treaties states that the Convention applies to treaties between States, 110 the International Law 
Commission, charged with recommending the proposed codification of the Convention, 
explained that the fact that the scope is so defined is not intended in any way to deny that 
other subjects of international law, such as international organisations, may conclude 
treaties.111 This is reflected in Article 3 of the Convention which States that ‘[t]he fact that the 
present Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between States and 
other subjects of international law . . . shall not affect the legal force of such 
agreements.’112Thus, the United Nations, as an international organisation, does have the 
capacity to conclude treaties.113 This capacity has been recognised in the Vienna Convention 
on Law of Treaties Between States and International Organisations or Between International 
Organisations114 which, though not yet in force, recognises that such capacity is necessary for 
international organisations to perform their functions and fulfil their purposes.115
Despite the fact that the United Nations has the capacity to conclude a treaty, whether the 
United Nations has the capacity to be a member of the particular treaties which make up the 
laws of war must still be determined.116The intent of the drafters of the Conventions was to 
limit a belligerent's conduct, in the name of humanity, to that which is actually necessary for 
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military purposes.117 As a means to achieving their humanitarian ends, the drafters did not 
limit the application of the rules to ‘States’.118 For example, rebel forces are considered 
belligerents. In Peck's opinion, if the parties to the Conventions are willing to treat 
individuals, under the Nuremberg principles, as subjects of international law in order to reach 
their humanitarian goals, it can hardly be argued that an international organisation, which 
represents a significant portion of the international community, should not also be regarded as 
an intended subject of those rules when it is involved in an armed conflict of an international 
and warlike character or in a conflict that becomes internationalised due to its intervention.119
Therefore, technically the UN has the capacity to formally accede to the Conventions. The 
eligibility of the UN to formally accede to the Hague and Geneva Conventions rests on the 
consent of the current parties to the treaties.120 For example, each of the Geneva Conventions 
expressly provides that accession is open only to ‘Powers’.121 Some writers have concluded 
that although the term ‘Power’ or, ‘Puissance’ is a term which is normally used in treaties 
synonymously with ‘States,’ it does not preclude other subjects of international law which 
may be parties to an armed conflict of an international and warlike character, and thus the 
UN, too, is a ‘Power’.122 Supporting this assertion is the fact that the Conventions are 
concerned with ‘military power’ and the protection to be afforded to victims of conflict. The 
Conventions are ‘people-oriented’ not ‘territory-oriented’, with all the consequential debates 
that might arise concerning sovereignty and State relations. The term ‘Power’ in the 
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Conventions would be argued to encompass UN forces as a ‘military power’, party to a 
conflict, or an occupying power where it has recognised forces under a chain of command 
responsible to UN Headquarters in New York.
Although the UN may have the capacity to formally accede to the Conventions, its 
willingness to enforce the laws of war along its chain of command is not enough.123 It is a 
recognised principle of the customary laws of war that an entity must also have the ability to 
compel its Commander and its Force to act lawfully.124 It would seem that the argument for 
the UN not being held accountable for international humanitarian law violations by its 
peacekeepers, lies in the fact that the rank-and-file soldiers in the missions do not swear 
allegiance to the UN, the troops wear their national uniforms and the governments retain 
discretion as to the number and nature of command for their troops.125 It is important to note 
that  while the Security Council cannot be said to have total command over UN forces, it has 
full authority  as the force commander is under the direct authority of the UN Secretary-
General or his Special Representative. In addition, the troops act under the UN flag, bear UN 
insignia and that the Security Council creates and defines the missions under its Chapter VII 
powers: hence the troops are in essence an instrument of the Security Council as they are 
under an obligation to fulfil the specific mandate drawn up the Security Council and to change 
their military operations in accordance with the dictates of the Council.
123
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The seeming dichotomy between the Commander's responsibility for ordering the troops and 
the Participating State's responsibility for discipline raises serious questions concerning the 
requisite responsibility along the entire chain of command which the customary laws of war 
demand.126A possible solution for the assurance that such enforcement is mandatory would be 
for the UN to designate as its agent for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the 
Conventions, one or more of the Members who have contributed national contingents to the 
Force.127 Another possibility, however, is simply to assure that no mandate or regulation ever 
leaves the Participating State's responsibility to discipline its nationals up to its own discretion 
which happens to be the position adopted by the UN.128 This system has already failed three 
times in the 1990s.129 The subordination of international justice interests by national political 
interests in these cases, highlighted the unwillingness of States to investigate and prosecute its 
servants and/or agents.
III. THE UN AS A PARTY TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
             CONVENTIONS AND THE ROME STATUTE PROVISIONS 
 A. Triggering Mechanisms
This section of the article looks generally at the provisions of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter the ICC)130 in so far as they relate to violations of laws 
of war and the interplay of national interests as well as international justice interests. It gives a 
the participating State for that purpose. This is reaffirmed in section 4 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above 
note 23. 
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general insight into the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction with regard to the issue of UN 
forces. It is necessary to state that the International Criminal Court has automatic, or inherent 
jurisdiction over all core crimes131 when the alleged crime is committed on the territory of a 
State party or when the accused is a national of a State party. The Court’s jurisdiction is thus 
two-fold. 
The Court's jurisdiction can be 'triggered' in one of three ways. The Court may exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in the Statute if a situation is referred to the Prosecutor: 
(1) by the Security Council acting pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the Charter of the 
United Nations; (2) by a State Party to the Statute; or (3) by the Prosecutor acting proprio 
motu - on their own initiative - following an independent investigation.132 Referrals by States 
Parties and the Prosecutor acting in an independent capacity are subject to additional 
limitations before the Court will be permitted to exercise its jurisdiction. 
1. Security Council Referral
 Pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if '[a] 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.' This provision, in effect, acknowledges the primacy afforded to the Security Council 
130 Rome Statute, above note 21.
131
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in maintaining international peace and security.133 The Security Council has always had a 
wide range of powers under the Charter to determine and respond to threats to  international 
peace.134 Most significant is Article 42 which authorises the Council to impose its decisions 
through the use of force where necessary to restore  international stability.135
In light of this pre-eminence of the constitutional authority of the Security Council, and 
particularly of the five permanent members who have the power of veto over Council 
decisions, all States recognised, albeit reluctantly in some cases, that the Rome Statute could 
not diminish the UN Security Council's constitutional authority. At least four of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, France and the Russian 
Federation) advocated strongly for the power to veto prosecutions which involved situations 
of which the Council was seized under Chapter VII of the Charter.136 Such a provision would 
have granted inordinate influence over the independence of the Court to members of the 
Council . If such a provision had been included, a member of the Council could, potentially, 
have precluded the Court from dealing with a case by simply including the situation on the 
agenda of the Council. Vesting the Security Council with power to control the Court's docket 
would have jeopardised the Court's judicial independence and politicised its  work. Inevitably, 
it is unlikely that the ICC would ever have been able to prosecute any member of a UN force 
133 UN Charter, Article 24 (1).
134
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as the Security Council would have viewed this as an interference by the ICC in its actions 
exercised in accordance with its authority to maintain international peace and security.
The final provision of the Rome Statute rather than prohibit the Court from investigating a 
matter being dealt with by the Security Council, shifts the onus onto the Security Council to 
affirmatively halt an investigation. Article 16 provides that no prosecution may be 
commenced for twelve months where the Security Council has adopted a resolution under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to that effect. Permanent members of the Security Council, 
therefore, do not possess the right to obstruct an ICC investigation by exercising an individual 
power of veto. Rather, the Security Council as a whole must take an affirmative step by 
passing a resolution should it wish to prevent the commencement of a prosecution. In the 
absence of veto power by the Security Council over the ICC, one may hazard a fair rule of 
thumb, that everytime UN forces commit violations of international humanitarian law, they 
open themselves up to the possibility of investigation and prosecution by the ICC.
2. State Party Complaint
The Court will also be able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of an alleged crime under the 
Statute where a referral is made by a State Party in accordance with article 14.137 A State 
Party is required , as far as possible to, provide supporting documentation specifying the 
relevant circumstances for its referral. As the experience of human rights treaty bodies has 
demonstrated, mechanisms which provide for State-based complaint procedures have been 
greatly under-utilised to date because States are reticent to initiate proceedings against other 
137 Rome Statute, above note 21, Article 13 (a),.
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States or their nationals due to the political and diplomatic ramifications of doing so.138 Even 
within the new regime of the ICC, it is unlikely that this method will be any popular. States 
are more inclined to make decisions based on political rather than judicial interests whenever 
the issue of investigation and prosecution of their troops by the ICC arises.
3. Independent Investigation by the Prosecutor
The Rome Statute includes a provision for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction based on a 
Prosecutor with independent powers of investigation.139The Prosecutor is empowered under 
the Statute to receive information on potential crimes from a variety of sources including 
States, organs of the United Nations, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, 
and 'other reliable sources'.140This is perhaps the strongest feature of the ICC as an 
independent and autonomous penal court that will not be riddled with political considerations 
rather than  considerations of upholding international justice. The Security Council has no 
power to review the Prosecutor’s case docket. The proprio motu power is a useful tool that 
deflects a potential abuse of power by the veto of permanent members of the Security Council 
predicated on national interests  and political motivations.
There are a number of provisions in the Statute placing safeguards on prosecutorial discretion 
to prevent or limit the likelihood of politically-motivated complaints. The Prosecutor must 
gain the authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber before proceeding with an investigation.141
The Pre-Trial Chamber is obliged to determine that there is a reasonable basis to proceed and 
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that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.142 This provision is viewed by its 
advocates as an important victory in the establishment of a truly independent court. It is on 
this plane that the ICC will have authority to investigate and prosecute UN troops for  
international humanitarian law violations, even over the nationals of non-party States. It is 
significant that for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over an accused person, it is not necessary 
for both the territorial State and national State to be party to the Statute. It is enough that one 
of them is.143 This eliminates the possibility of a State of a national controlling the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
B. Criminal Jurisdiction and Mandate
This section of the article focuses on war crimes as provided for in the Rome Statute as this 
category of crimes encompasses international humanitarian law violations that are the focus 
of this article. This section discusses issues concerning crimes against humanity to contrast 
and highlight the differences in judicial discretion by the Court in relation to these two 
categories of crimes. Crimes against humanity are mentioned in Article 5 of the Rome Statute
and enunciated in Article 7.  The drafting of a new definition of crimes against humanity 
provided a unique opportunity to develop international criminal law on the subject. The 
provision consists of a chapeau which outlines the threshold requirements to be fulfilled 
before certain acts are considered a crime against humanity and an enumerated list of acts 
which can constitute the crime. Article 7(2) also includes a list of clarifications on the 
meaning of specific words or phrases in Article 7(l) and they must be read conjunctively in 
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any interpretation of the related provisions in paragraph 1. 
The Rome Statute makes a significant contribution to international jurisprudence concerning 
the formulation of torture and gender-specific sexual offences.  The Statute also includes a 
new ground of persecution on the basis of gender. However, the provision is accompanied by 
a limitation that such persecution must be committed in conjunction with another crime under 
the Statute.144 Additionally, rape and other acts of sexual violence can be separately 
prosecuted under the Rome Statute as war crimes involving grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, which include torture, inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health,145 The definition of torture in Article 7(2)(e) no longer 
requires the involvement of a public official in contrast to the definition of torture in Article 1 
of the UN Convention on Torture.146
In relation to war crimes, unanimity of opinion did exist for the inclusion of grave breaches of 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 but beyond that specific category of war crimes, 
widespread disagreement emerged in two key areas as to: (1) whether to include, and if so 
precisely which, acts other than the grave breaches of the 1949 Conventions committed in the 
context of international armed conflicts; and, (2) whether to include, and if so which, acts 
committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts. The substantive provisions of 
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Article 8 of the Rome Statute are now grouped in four distinct sections in order from the least 
to the most contentious.147 Of significance are sub-paragraphs (2)(c) and 2(e) of Article 8 
which incorporate the lists of acts which can constitute war crimes within non-international 
armed conflicts. Article 8(2)(c) incorporates serious violations of Common Article 3 while the 
list of acts in article 8(2)(e) is drawn extensively, but not exclusively, from Additional
Protocol II.148
C. Threshold Level of Gravity
The Rome Statute does not constitute codification of international criminal law. Instead, the 
exercise in relation to substantive crimes at the diplomatic conference was to negotiate the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the new Court which would only deal with 'the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community'.149Thus there was need to set a general 
threshold level for crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. Along with the constitutional 
authority of the UN Security Council over the Court's docket in cases coming under its 
exercise of UN Charter Chapter VII, the threshold level of gravity poses the second biggest 
obstacle to an exercise of authority by the Court over UN troops.
Some delegations argued in Rome that, since the Court was intended only to exercise 
jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes, the definition of war crimes ought to 
include a threshold level of gravity. Other delegations objected to this proposal on the grounds 
official or other person in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in 
or incidental to lawful sanctions.’(Emphasis added).
147
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that the Court ought to be able to exercise a discretion about the exercise of its jurisdiction 
over an alleged war crime. 150Article 8(l) provides an indicative threshold such that '[t]he 
Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.'151 The use of the term 
'in particular' leaves open the possibility that the Court could exercise its jurisdiction in 
respect of a single act constituting a war crime within one or other of the acts listed in article 
8(2).152 The possibility of a prosecution for a single act constituting a war crime pursuant to 
Article 8 stands in marked contrast to the threshold level of gravity for a crime against 
humanity. 
With regard to the threshold level of gravity for inhumane acts to qualify as crimes against 
humanity, the two accepted indices of the gravity of alleged acts were 'widespread' and 
'systematic'. 'Widespread' relates to the scale of an attack against a civilian population - not an 
isolated act but large scale action directed against multiple victims. 'Systematic', on the other 
hand, carries a connotation of premeditation by an organised group - an attack carefully 
planned and undertaken as part of a common policy. Article 7(l) provides that the particular 
acts must have been 'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population' where such an attack is understood to mean 'a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such 
150
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attack'.153 This formulation therefore effectively excludes isolated and single acts as crimes 
against humanity. While the prosecution will not be required to prove that the alleged acts 
were both widespread and systematic, it will now be insufficient merely to prove one or the 
other indicia to constitute an indictable crime against humanity. One hopes that it will not be 
more difficult for the prosecution to prove the elements of a crime against humanity in 
particular cases.154
Thus it will be possible to prosecute individual UN troops for violations of international 
humanitarian law under war crimes without the constraints involved in the high threshold 
level required to prosecute for crimes against humanity. It is possible that in many cases, an 
act can fall under the category of crime against humanity or a war crime. But as the text of the 
Court’s provisions  provide, the particular case’s classification test is premised on two indices, 
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’. Thus, there is, in effect, a lower threshold level in war crimes 
that allows the prosecution of single and isolated incidents of violations as discussed above. It 
is unlikely that the high threshold level for crimes against humanity can be realistically 
fulfilled in the prosecution of UN troops for violations of international humanitarian law. This 
is so because the acts committed by UN troops tend to be isolated and sporadic acts of 
military indiscipline or indifference. Even when multiple, these incidents are not part of a 
‘large scale action’ or ‘form part of a common policy’, instead these occurr as a  result of 
‘overzealous’ actions of the UN troops.
153 Rome Statute, above note 21, Article 7(2)(a).
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D National Interests vis-a-vis International Justice Interests in The Rome Statute
State- Consent Regime
The Security Council’s referral of a situation to the Court overrides any requirement of the 
consent of a relevant State as a precondition for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction: that 
authority is inherent in the Council's constitutional authority under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. However, in respect of cases initiated either by a complaint from a State Party or on 
the basis of an independent investigation on the part of the Prosecutor, the Court does not 
exercise compulsory jurisdiction. Instead, the Rome Statute requires the consent of either the 
territorial State or the State of the accused's nationality for the case to proceed.155 If either 
Territorial State or the State of nationality are not States Parties to the Statute, it is possible 
for one or other of them to extend ad hoc consent to allow the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction in a particular case.156 It should be recognised that this State consent regime was 
the biggest stumbling block to US support157 for the Rome Statute. The US delegation insisted 
that the consent of both the territorial State and the State of nationality was critical to the 
credibility of the Court.  Essentially, the Court’s jurisdiction may be exercised over any 
person anywhere if that person is a national of a State party or committed a crime on the 
territory of a State Party. A non-State party may consent on an ad hoc basis to the Court’s 
jurisdiction where necessary. Thus, if a territorial State (party or non-party) is willing to 
subject itself to the tribunal, that suffices to confer the Court’s jurisdiction over any national.
Complementarity
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Although the Rome Statute does not use the term 'complementarity', the Preamble and Article 
1 describe the new Court as a 'complement' to existing national courts and processes158 -
hence the coining of the term 'complementarity'. The agreed formula in the Rome Statute is 
that a State with jurisdictional competence has the first right to institute proceedings unless 
the ICC decides that the State 'is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution .’ The assumption in Rome was that such a determination would be 
straightforward for the ICC in either of two situations: (1) where the State, for whatever 
reason, chooses not to exercise its jurisdictional competence - ‘the unwilling State’; or (2) 
where the State's legal and administrative structures have completely broken down. 
The complementarity referred to in the statute strives to harmonise, wherever possible, 
multiple and competing sources of jurisdiction over international crimes. It developed as a 
principled and pragmatic way to accommodate the conflicting imperatives of State 
sovereignty and the need for a permanent international institution to end impunities for 
atrocities at a time of global proliferation of localised armed conflict. As suggested by its 
name it ensures that the ICC complements rather than replaces, national judicial systems. In 
recognising States concurrent jurisdiction over serious violations of international law, the 
Court is expected to strengthen national enforcement of human rights and human rights 
norms.
A critical issue of concern though is that, in the context of a permanent ICC, there seems little 
157
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justification for a separate regime for Security Council referrals, which undermines the 
Court’s complementary juridical underpinning and its support. While acknowledging that the 
ICC has no authority to alter the criteria for the exercise of the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
powers, the lack of parallel complementarity criteria for Security Council referrals to the 
Court raises the spectre of a Court reduced on some level to permanent institutionalised 
Security Council Ad-Hoc-ism, which re-enshrines Security Council hegemony. This would re-
introduce the Security Council’s power and pave way for national interests of States to 
override international justice interests. In this scenario, the prosecution of UN troops would 
never materialise. Preferably and ideally, the ICC should be for a formally independent 
institution. 
Admissibility
Criteria concerning admissibility and procedures that must be followed are spelled out in 
Articles 17 and 18, and are applied in conjunction with the double jeopardy principles of 
Article 20. The Statute establishes a presumption of inadmissibility whenever a State is 
exercising, or has exercised, its national jurisdiction over a case. Good faith is both presumed 
and expected in the national adjudication of such cases, whatever their outcome subject to the 
ne bis idem provision.159 The standard for admissibility is articulated as a State’s 
unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out an investigation or a prosecution. This 
standard is applied to prospective and ongoing investigations and prosecutions as well as a 
State’s decision not to go forward with a prosecution after conducting an investigation. If a 
State will not or genuinely cannot conduct a good faith investigation or prosecution, then the 
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ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the case. This is to prevent a State from blocking the 
Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of its own assertion of a bona fide process or the existence of 
jurisdiction that confers national primacy to it. It should be noted that for the purposes of 
articulating the language of admissibility, what is being reviewed is a ‘case’ not a ‘situation.’ 
In other words, Article 17 presumes that the Prosecutor has already made a determination that 
sufficient evidence exists to charge at least one individual with the commission of a crime or 
crimes, and that a State’s investigation and/or prosecution corresponds (at least) to that 
particular individual.
Immunities
In recognising that in matters of international law, ‘individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State’, 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides against ‘immunities and procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law’(emphasis added) which may bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction over such a 
person. An unresolved but controversial issue that is related to jurisdiction is the question of 
amnesties and pardons that States from time to time grant to perpetrators within the Court’s 
mandate.160Yet another issue that appears unresolved is the status of forces agreements the 
UN may from time to time enter into with States with regard to the presence of UN forces on 
the State’s territory.
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V.CONCLUSION
The documented international humanitarian law violations by troops participating in UN 
military operations demonstrate the need-[now that the United Nations has been given a 
breath of new life and may become the ‘tool’ for enforcing or maintaining peace]- to consider 
whether the UN can be held accountable for violations by its troops of laws of war. 
Traditionally international humanitarian laws have regulated the conduct of States during 
armed conflict, and have now gradually come to be  recognised as applying to United Nations 
forces as well. The rules, embodied in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, should regulate 
the conduct of UN forces, and do so insofar as they embody customary international law. It is 
to be noted that of the four categories (including the yet to be defined crime of aggression) of 
crimes in the Rome Statute,161 it is in the category of war crimes in which the black letter law-
the Geneva Conventions-most strongly establishes inherent or automatic jurisdiction.162 The 
common articles state ‘[e]ach High contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search 
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered committed, such grave breaches…, 
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts…’163This 
affirmative obligation will be placed on the UN which can choose to designate the municipal 
courts of one or more of the Participating States in a particular mission to prosecute or refer 
the matter to the ICC.
However, because there are those who feel that the unique status of the United Nations Forces 
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exempts it from the obligation to observe these rules in their entirety, the United Nations 
should become a party to the Hague and Geneva Conventions. By doing so, the laws of war 
would bind on it as a subject. This, in turn, would rise to direct rights and duties on the part of 
individual UN troops. Becoming a party to the Conventions will ensure that the UN Forces 
will be held to no less of a standard than other parties to an armed conflict. Such a result is not 
only desirable, but is also logical. After all, the UN is the body created  ‘to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights’.164 To hold the UN to a lesser standard would require the belief
that the UN itself is not capable of protecting those rights or that the UN exist beyond their 
pale.
State immunity and special procedural rules are unavailable under the Rome Statute as a 
defence against the institution of criminal proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court. Nothing in the Rome Statute provides limitations to the categorisation of subjects who 
can have judicial proceedings instituted against them by the three methods laid down, that 
would the trigger the prosecutory mechanism as long as they are natural persons.165 This is 
important as the UN urges national courts to prosecute UN forces responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law.166 Thrice in the last decade of the 20th Century, national 
adjudicative mechanisms failed to guarantee justice for the victims of laws of war167
violations by UN forces. 
The issue of the Court’s judicial authority over UN forces is unpalatable to the international 
164 UN Charter, above note 1, Preamble, para.2.
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and national political framework and is a volatile international issue in view of its potential to 
cripple Security Council sanctioned ‘police action’. Concommitantly there may be concern 
that subjecting the UN troops to the international judicial process would curtail advances in 
the post Cold War collective global security regime. It is instructive that the complementarity 
regime in the Statute represents a broad protection regime for State Parties.168 Through 
complementarity, State jurisdiction is preserved by efficiently operating national criminal 
justice systems. It is in the interests of the planet’s citizenry that the UN be held accountable 
for its military operations. For long State political interests have subsumed the interests of  
‘[w]e the people of the United Nations’169 reducing the UN to a global association of Nation -
States rather than an organisation entrusted with the human rights values and aspirations of 
the planet’s citizenry. A blank cheque to the Security Council in its ‘police action’ is an 
anathema to the international rule-of-law regime that the UN is building as a foundation for 
the international legal order. General UN policy subscribing to the application of fundamental 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law is not enough. The rights and duties 
must be directly possessed by the UN as a subject of these laws and ultimately these rights 
and duties must be transposed to the objects concerned, the individual UN troops. 
The reality is that the ICC is still along way in coming, thus there is an urgent need to 
strengthen the current UN military operation framework. The Security Council routinely 
adopts resolutions long on generalities and short on particulars. It is important that the 
conceptual and procedural clarity of the mandate is spelt out. The Security Council should 
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provide meaningful military guidelines of the operation in light of the mandate. Particular 
emphasis should be given to observance of international humanitarian law especially by UN 
troops involved in a spectrum of conflict.
Problems also exist throughout the entire chain of command in UN forces. The UN secretariat 
should carry out further reforms in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), by 
putting in place a standing command-and-control cadre. 170One of the most significant 
challenges of any UN military mission is the establishment of a field headquarters. Generally 
new staff take time to know each other, and most importantly to establish ground rules for 
working together and addressing issues arising from the troops as a collectivity rather than as 
a loose association of semi-autonomous national contingents. Inevitably, force commanders 
end up by-passing mission field headquarters, and receiving orders from their Capitals on all 
aspects of  troop misconduct. This is owing to governments’ exclusive rights to deal with 
troop indiscipline in their contingents.171 This allows any damaging information and/or 
evidence on troop misconduct to be labelled as classified by concerned governments and thus 
out of public domain. 
The DPKO office after its 1996 reformation, had units formed within it for among other 
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purposes, establishing training criteria and syllabuses for national contingents.172 The Unit 
should be active especially among countries that routinely contribute troops, to ensure that the 
governments endeavour to disseminate international humanitarian law to the troops 
extensively. This will forestall government buck-passing in the event of international 
humanitarian violations. Governments contributing troops should be encouraged to brief 
troops before departure and to emphasis the need to observe international humanitarian law in 
the course of their duties. A reminder that they are not above the rule of international law will 
have a sobering effect on troops.
The DPKO should have a nucleus of civilian and military personnel assigned the task of 
discipline among UN forces.173 This senior level task force should be responsible for regular 
consultations with the field headquarters on the issue of troop discipline and conduct. The task 
force should be responsible to the Security Council, and serve as an interface between the 
political authorities and force commanders. By being responsible to the Security Council, the 
task force will enjoy a sphere of institutional independence from the Secretary-General. Part 
of the current dilemma is that the Secretary-General plays two antagonistic roles, he is in 
charge of peacekeeping operations and is at the same time expected to be a neutral mediator.
Finally, to deal with the issue of strong national political currents to the externalisation of 
troop discipline, senior officers of the larger contributing forces in any given mission should 
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form a disciplinary arm as part of the field headquarters staff. Troop-contributing States 
should be asked to deal through this mechanism on matters of discipline affecting their 
contingent (even as they file reports to their Capitals, which is inevitable)-the representative 
disciplinary arm should then investigate, document and safeguard any evidence on the matter. 
The task force at the DPKO will second military officers as liaison persons who will forward 
reports to the Security Council. This will short-circuit the internalisation of a disciplinary 
matter by a particular contingent, and as history has shown, give the governments an 
opportunity to destroy or withhold evidence or cover-up. When the information is out in the 
open, governments are generally keen to give a good account of themselves. Documented 
information and evidence will facilitate military transparency and government accountability, 
which is vital, for these two institutions are notorious for using their code of secrecy as an 
alibi for conspiracies to deal with image damaging information.
